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The Use of Evolution Theory in Law
M.B.W. SINCLAIR*
"Law, .... like Janus, is two faced."'
Evolution as an approach to understanding law has recently un-
dergone a substantial renaissance. Especially in the work of Profes-
sors Hovenkamp,2 Elliott,3 and Clark,4 one can find extremely
useful guidance in the history and method of this approach. Basi-
cally, one takes the ideas of evolutionary theory as developed in bio-
logical, geological, and social sciences and applies them to law or
aspects of it.5 If all goes well this will throw a new light on the de-
velopment of an area of the law, how it reached its present state, and
how it might change in the future.6
But one has to be careful: law is not biology or geology, and so
the same considerations do not necessarily apply. It is all too easy
to get locked into a particular position on, say, biological evolution
and lose sight of important peculiarities of legal evolution, or,
worse, to miss the evolutionary aspects of law altogether. For exam-
ple, Priest criticized Clark's use of evolution theory as Lamarckian, 7
* Assistant Professor of Law at Indiana University School of Law, Blooming-
ton, Indiana.
1. Picard, "Facts of Legal Evolution, in III EVOLUTION OF LAw 163, 177
(Kocourek & Wigmore eds. 1918).
2. Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEx. L. REV. 645 (1985),
a thorough history and analysis of the impact of Darwinian thought on
jurisprudence.
3. Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38
(1985), provides a history and analysis of the use of evolutionary concepts injuris-
prudence from pre-Darwinian beginnings through an early popularity in the works
of Holmes (see also Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal Process as Artificial Intelligence,
13J. L. STUD. 113 (1984); Vetter, The Evolution of Holmes, Holmes and Evolution, 72
CALIF. L. REV. 343 (1984)), Wigmore, and Corbin and, after a hiatus of some fifty or
more years, to its recent and vigorous revival.
4. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE LJ. 1238 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Legal Evolution].
5. See Elliott, supra, note 3; Clark, supra note 4; see also Rubin, Why is the Com-
mon Law Efficient?, 6J. L. STUD. 51 (1977) and Priest, The Common Law Process and the
Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. L. STUD. 65 (1977) for an interesting example of the
notions of selection and adaptation in action.
6. See, e.g., Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolu-
tion and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90 (1977).
7. Priest, The New Scientism in Legal Scholarship: A Comment on Clark and Posner,
90 YALE LJ. 1284 (1981). In the jargon, "Lamarckian" is a code word for the in-
heritance of acquired characteristics. This was only one aspect of the very rich evo-
lutionary theory propounded by Jean Baptiste Pierre Antoine de Monet, Chevalier
de Lamark,- see, e.g., PHILOSOPHIE ZOOLOGIQUE (1809)-but it is the one for which
it is best remembered.
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a clear failing if found in a biological explanation.' But it is obvious
that legal evolution will involve the inheritance, by one "legal gener-
ation" (state of the law) from its predecessor, of characteristics ac-
quired by the predecessor. It is absurb to think otherwise. The
evolution of any social system requires the inheritance of acquired
characteristics.9 But law is not biology and so we should not expect
it to meet the same theoretical conditions.' °
"Evolution" is a word that has a very wide range of meanings."
Stein, for example, means by it only "theories which claim to ex-
plain legal change not merely in historical terms but as proceeding
according to certain determinate stages, or in a certain pre-deter-
mined manner."' 2 It would be quite misleading to restrict the
meaning of the word as applied to law when no similar restriction
applies elsewhere: biological evolution is not thought to proceed in
"certain determinate stages" or in a "pre-determined manner." On
the other hand, as Hovenkamp has shown,'" it is equally unproduc-
tive to call "evolutionary" any legal theory for which one can find an
analogue in biology.14 " 'Evolutionary' theories of jurisprudence
are more than merely theories that law changes."' 5
Just what evolution in law is, and how it might work, is the basic
subject of this investigation. Nevertheless, a definition of the word
"evolution" as it is used in jurisprudence should be possible neither
at its beginning nor its conclusion. What is at stake is not the defini-
tion of a word, but the usefulness of a theory in explaining sequen-
tial change in the state of the law.
To date, the most detailed and general statement of a theory of
legal evolution is Clark's "seven-step method for the construction
and validation of a full, formal study of a line of legal evolution."16
Clark's steps are:
8. Priest, supra note 7, at 1288.
9. See, e.g., P. MEDEWAR, PLUTO'S REPUBLIC 173 (1984); R. BOYD & P. RICHER-
SON, CULTURE AND THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 6-12 (1985); L. CAVALLI-SFORZA &
M. FELDMAN, CULTURAL TRANSMISSION AND EVOLUTION (1981).
10. Priest also argued that as biological evolution must occur uniformly,
Clark's analysis was deficient because of the nonuniform development it contem-
plates; Priest, supra note 7, at 1289. He thus misses both significant recent develop-
ments in biological evolutionary theory- "punctuated equilibrium," see, e.g.,
Gould, Is a New and General Theory of Evolution Emerging?, 6 PALEOBIOLOGY 119
(1980); P. BOWLER, EVOLUTION: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 322-26 (1984)-and the
significant differences between law and biology.
11. Bowler, The Changing Meaning of "Evolution", 36J. HIST. IDEAS 95 (1975).
12. P. STEIN, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 122 (1980).
13. Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 648-50.
14. As does Elliott, supra note 3, at 38-39. Hovenkamp argues for explicit use
of natural selection as the defining characteristic of evolutionary theories in law.
Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 649.
15. Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 683.
16. Legal Evolution, supra note 4, at 1256.
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1. Define the trend. Describe the shift from rule (or rule
complex) A to rule B... identify and document the rele-
vant common elements in the shift from stage to stage ....
2. Identify starting points... this will mean identifying the
sources, whether in persons or institutions, of the genera-
tion of new rules or of the variations in old ones ....
3. Identify principles of development .. . that is, describe the
"motor" of change.., some evolutionary mechanism that
selects the rules in question over rival or alternative rules
4. Identify relevant conditions of development... specify those
environmental conditions that bear on how the mecha-
nisms of selection actually operate on the starting points
5. Put the explanation together. Tie together the results of
following the second, third, and fourth guidelines into an
explanation of the trend identified at the first stage ....
6. Consider contrary facts and arguments. . . . Ideally one
should state explicitly what data would disconfirm the ex-
planation ....
7. Do thought experiments on the explanatory factors, and when
feasible, test the results against the evidence. This step is critical,
for unless it is taken, it will be very difficult for the method
to produce explanatory patterns and lawlike generaliza-
tions . . . that might be combined with others into some-
thing that could responsibly be called a "theory" of
evolution. 17
This pattern omits one element critical to a theory of evolution,
namely, a theory of retention. Unless it can be shown that the legal
development in question is constrained to variations of the previous
state of the law, the historical analysis thus developed is not evolu-
tionary, but merely adaptationist.
This deficiency in Clark's model and the limitations in explana-
tory value that result from it are developed further in section I of
this Article. Section II is devoted to a brief account, for illustrative
purposes, of the evolution of the tort of seduction. Section III re-
turns to the theory of evolution and its application to law. Section
IV is about explanatory content and testability: how it is that an
evolutionary theory can enhance our understanding of the law and
its development.
17. Id. at 1256-59. The ellipsis in the quote from step 7 covers "that begin to
look like true science, or;" it is omitted because I believe the criteria for "true sci-
ence" should be governed by the subject matter, and not by some alien "paradigm
science" such as physics. The value of evolutionary theories of law is in their power
to explain law, not in their appearing scientific.
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I. EVOLUTION THEORY IN LAW
Theories of evolution typically have three basic components: a
theory of variation, a theory of selection, and a theory of transmis-
sion or retention.18 The theory of variation describes the mecha-
nism by which potential new organisms are generated. The theory
of selection describes how, from the variations generated, the suc-
cessful are selected, and the unsuccessful rejected. The theory of
retention/transmission describes how the characteristics of the suc-
cessfully selected entity are retained by the system or transmitted to
subsequent generations. In biological sciences the theory of selec-
tion is now well developed, and the theory of variation is the source
of most problems. The theory of transmission/retention is rela-
tively uncontroversial as a component of evolutionary theory.
Neither the evolutionist nor the creationist'9 dispute that the initial
properties of a member of one generation are controlled by proper-
ties of members of prior generations. °
In law, the theoretical hurdles are reversed. Variation, at least
in the United States, is relatively straightforward. There are no
shortages of candidate laws and advocates of them. Lawyers, in rep-
resenting clients, commonly have an incentive to formulate and ar-
gue for new variations on old law. Further, with the gaping maws of
two hundred student edited law reviews ever hungry, especially for
something new, and the demands of tenure and promotion commit-
tees ever increasing, the system of legal academia generates ample
variety and rhetorical support to boot.2
Selection addresses the problem of how replacements of pres-
ent laws get selected from the variants. Theories of selection are a
standard product of legal scholarship, merely described differently.
Positivists, realists, economists, and critics all offer theories of selec-
tion. They differ only as to what it is, or ought to be, that law adapts
to and how the adaptive mechanism works. Furthermore, a theory
of selection, whether it purports to be descriptive2 2 or normative, 23
is a theory of adaptation. This is so even when the adaption is one
18. Campbell, Variation and Selective Retention in Socio-Cultural Evolution, in So-
CIAL CHANGE IN DEVELOPING AREAS 19, 29 (H. Barringer, G. Blanksten & R. Mack
eds. 1965).
19. I mention creationism only to indicate that acceptance of this position cov-
ers the spectrum, from science to mythology.
20. However, the theoretical possibility of lateral transfer of genetic material
between species is now regarded as a possibly significant empirical phenomenon
for some biological domains (fungi and bacteria are the suggested examples). See
Gould, Linnaean Limits, 95 NAT. HIST. #8 16-23 (August, 1986).
21. There may thus be socio-legal profit in shear proliferation.
22. As for example did realist theories.
23. As for example do law and economics theories.
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of which the author disapproves.24 It is a mistake to think that evo-
lutionary selection, by being adaptive, necessarily generates im-
provement." Clark's seven-point method of analysis makes explicit
these aspects of theories of law; but there is nothing peculiarly evo-
lutionary about it.26
The third element of an evolutionary analysis, the theory of re-
tention/transmission, while not a major issue in the natural sci-
ences, is of peculiar significance to law. Given that a particular
candidate law has at some time past been chosen for enactment, why
does it tend to remain in place when conditions for selection
change?
When the lawmaker considers the possibility of a change in a
particular area, she has before her, potentially at least, the full pano-
ply of possible variants generated by the system, including those
produced by dissident, as well as mainstream thought. She can se-
lect the law best designed to suit the needs of society at that time
and as best projected into the future. Why then should the
lawmaker confine her choices to variations on the old law rather
than adopt a new one designed specifically for present and antici-
pated circumstances? Why adopt an evolutionary rather than a rev-
olutionary lawmaking position? This Article focuses on these
questions. Unless they can provide answers, evolutionary theories
of law have no distinctive explanatory power.27
Stephen Jay Gould, in his beautiful essay, The Panda's Thumb,28
makes the point that if you want to illustrate evolution you should
do so, not with an organism that is optimally fitted to its environ-
mental niche, but rather with "odd arrangements and funny solu-
tions." 29 An optimally adapted organism is better evidence for a
theory of design by an omnipotent creator than it is for evolution.
By contrast, "[o]dd arrangements and funny solutions are the proof
of evolution-paths that a sensible God would never tread but that
natural process, constrained by history, follows perforce."' The
24. For example, Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO
L. REV. 209 (1979).
25. S. GOULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB: MORE REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY
24 (1980); P. BOWLER, supra note 10, at 279-81.
26. Pure adaptionist analyses, such as Clark's, are also subject to attack as tau-
tological; see Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation, 90 YALE LJ. 1275, 1278-
81 (1981) (commenting on Clark, Legal Evolution); Gordon, Historicism in Legal Schol-
arship, 90 YALE LJ. 1017, 1028-36 (1981); text infra at notes 119-22.
27. "[T]he absence of an effective retention system would be grounds for re-
jecting the notion of socio-cultural evolution." Campbell, supra note 18, at 34.
28. S. GOULD, supra note 25, at 19-26.
29. Id. at 20.
30. Id. at 20-2 1. Hence the topic, the panda's thumb. The panda, being a bear
and originally a carnivore, does not have a thumb but uses instead an elongation of
the radial sesamoid bone. "IT]he panda must use parts on hand and settle for an
enlarged wrist bone and a somewhat clumsy, but quite workable, solution. The
1987]
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importance of this distinction to arguments about legal evolution
was noted long ago, 3 ' but now seems too readily forgotten.
Evolution has always been opposed to design. A system
designed by a rational agent is not the product of evolution. The
distinction is especially significant in the evolution of law. Change
in law would seem, prima facie, to result from "the action of the
human mind, creating, modifying, discarding ideas of that class col-
lectively denominated law."'3 2 As criticism this is misguided.3 3 That
the variation or selection mechanisms in a developing system in-
volve rational agency does not preclude an evolutionary explana-
tion.3 4  It may, however, greatly diminish the value of such
explanation.
In biological systems variations can only be generated from or-
ganisms already in existence; "[a]n engineer's best solution is
debarred by history."' 35 Without a similar constraint, an evolution-
ary explanation of law avails us not at all; design offers the better
explanation. As noted, Clark's seven-point plan for evolutionary ex-
planations of law36 omits this constraint. He thus provides the form
for a theory of selection and adaptation, but not for a full theory of
evolution in law.
Oliver Wendell Holmes saw this problem clearly.37 In his evo-
lutionary explanations, he offered a host of reasons for judges' limit-
ing themselves to tinkering with the law already in place rather than
redesigning it: The past captures and limits our imaginations;3 8 the
paucity of new ideas limits apparent options;39 the charismatic
power of the original judge inhibits the present judge;40 judges tend
to be set in their ways and following the old course is an easy route
sesamoid thumb wins no prize in the engineer's derby. It is, to use Michael Ghise-
lin's phrase, a contraption, not a lovely contrivance." Id. at 24.
31. See, e.g., H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 70 (1861, page ref. to Everyman ed.
1972).
32. Gager, Book Review, 28 YALE L.J. 617, 618 (1918) (reviewing Formative In-
fluences of Legal Development, in EVOLUTION OF LAW SERIES (Kocourek and Wigmore
eds.)).
33. It was clearly and convincingly refuted at the time by an Australian judge.
W. Jethro Brown, Law and Evolution, 29 YALE L.J. 394, 397-99 (1920).
34. Campbell, supra note 18, at 28.
35. S. GOULD, supra note 25, at 24.
36. Legal Evolution, supra note 4, at 1257-59.
37. For example: "IJ]udges do and must legislate, but they can do so only
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions. A common-law
judge could not say I think the doctrine of consideration is a bit of historical non-
sense and shall not enforce it in my court." Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
38. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 444 (1899).
39. Id. at 446.
40. Id. at 453. Holmes uses the example of Lord Hale, but the same might be
said of some of his own opinions, for example Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931), an
opinion that, despite its many critics, survived perhaps only because of its author.
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to peace of mind;41 old catch-phrases captivate us and delay serious
analysis.42 We could also add4" the force of tradition,44 except that
this is among the things to be explained, and not itself an explana-
tion.4" Judicial inertia, the seemingly unwillingness of judges to
match their decisions to the needs of a developing society, has long
been a source of criticism.46
The explanations Holmes offers all pertain to the judges them-
selves. When the phenomenon is so pervasive, however, one is
forced to suspect that it is structural features of the institutional role
and not merely accidental features of the occupant that are to
blame. Ajudge can decide only the case before her. From the point
of view of the trial judge willing to adopt a new variant, it is a matter
of accident whether a suitable case will ever come her way. Con-
versely, when a suitable dispute does arise it is a matter of accident
whether it will come before a judge with an interest in developing
that particular law. At the appellate level, opportunities for change
are further reduced by the tremendous cost to the litigants. It will
be only in areas litigated by parties with a great deal at stake and
large budgets that appeals courts will be presented with sufficient
opportunities to develop a new strain from the old law.
Judges are people, with normal human foibles. Most are heav-
ily burdened with decisional responsibilities that they are not likely
to try to increase. They will tend to follow the old rule, especially
when it emanates from a superior court,4 7 rather than take up a new,
unestablished line. The lawyer who unsuccessfully advocates a new
rule has a convincing explanation for his client that the lawyer who
unsuccessfully relies on an old rule does not. The latter and his
Brandeis' opinion in Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931) simi-
larly survived despite its want of rationality.
41. Holmes, supra note 38, at 455.
42. Id.
43. As does Keller, Law in Evolution, 28 YALE LJ. 769, 779-80 (1919).
44. Also appropriately called the "handicap of inertia." Brown, Law and Evolu-
tion, 29 YALE L.J. 394, 397 (1920).
45. Campbell, supra note 18, at 41.
46. Arch-positivist John Austin wrote:
But it is much to be regretted that Judges of capacity, experience and
weight, have not seized every opportunity of introducing a new rule (a rule
beneficial for the future) .... [T]heJudges of the Common Law Courts
would not do what they ought to have done, namely to model their rules
of law and of procedure to the growing exigencies of society, instead of
stupidly and sulkily adhering to the old and barbarous usages.
2 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 647 (5th ed. 1885).
47. Judges are understandably reluctant to invite the possibility of appeal and
overruling. See Lehman, How to Interpret a Difficult Statute, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 489,
501-07; and Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078 (1979).
This is not to say that judges are not courageous individuals, only that they are
unlikely to act courageously in all cases whatever the field.
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client will thus be the more likely to appeal. Even the highly organ-
ized lawyers' social system-the bar-can have the effect of promot-
ing stability of rules. As a social system, the legal profession acts so
as to reduce internal exchanges that are punitive (losses) in favor of
exchanges that are not; the system favors settlements. Pressures in-
ternal to the social group can thus produce results having little rele-
vance to current adaptiveness.48 In this way the system can
minimize personal costs to lawyers without necessarily passing them
on to clients: the settlement can always be justified by the "state of
the law."'49 Overall, in common law, change must run more gaunt-
lets than stasis.
All these are reasons why old rules will tend to survive of their
own momentum, with only minor adjustments from time to time to
prevent their becoming too maladaptive. Tinkering with old rules is
a common judicial game; replacing old rules is not.
But all this is about lawmaking by the common-law judge only;
legislatures are responsible for an increasing amount of lawmak-
ing.50 The legislator's view of a societal development calling for a
change in law is very different from that of the judge. He does not
depend on the accident of having a suitable case brought before
him, but can take the initiative in calling for change. In deciding the
shape and content of the new law the legislator, unlike the judge, is
not confined to a narrow set of facts, but may range as broadly as he
sees fit. In the data on which he bases his decision the legislator,
unlike the judge, is not limited to a narrow range of legally admissi-
ble historical evidence, but may seek expertise on all past and pres-
ent facts, and on projections of the future. And, unlike the judge,
the legislator does not have to worry about saddling his professional
colleagues with the uncertainty of the indefinite generality of impact
of a decision made on narrow, precise facts. Unlike the judge-made
common law, the legislatively created law is expressed in a determi-
nate string of words of intelligible scope and communicable
content.51
Both the judge and the legislator have an incentive to adapt the
law to social needs, to respond to changes in societal mores. Legis-
latures are forced by the democratic process to react to develop-
ments in popular morality. Judges are limited by the force of the
48. "Bureaucratic rigidity and inefficiency is one end product of a process in
which internal selective criteria have operated without the curb of external rele-
vance." Campbell, supra note 18, at 33.
49. Within a social group altruism can play a significant role as a selection cri-
terion. H. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS Part 2 (1983); D. WILSON, THE NATU-
RAL SELECTION OF POPULATION AND COMMUNITIES (1980).
50. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAw FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1-3 (1984).
51. Obviously this is not to suggest that there are no problems of scope and
meaning in statutory construction; it is merely to emphasize the contrast between
the nature of legislative and judge-made laws.
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arguments they can make in their opinions. An argument based on
values not accepted by society is not likely to be persuasive, few
courts will follow it, and so no "new rule" will result. As a force for
change, the legislator's incentive would seem the more acute, the
more constant, and the more directly evident.
For all these reasons one would expect that of the two kinds of
lawmaker, the legislator would be the more likely to take a revolu-
tionary position when law reform is called for, and the judge the
more evolutionary.52 But this is a question to be answered not by
theory, intuition, or casual empiricism, but by seeing what actually
happens in the course of the development of a body of law by legis-
lative and judicial action. How seriously we should take evolution-
ary explanations of law, and how illuminating they will be in each
sphere of lawmaking, will depend on the frequency of occurrence of
evolutionary lawmaking behavior. In this respect, legal evolution is
similar to biological:
The issue is not plausibility but relative frequency... natu-
ral history is such a hard science because most of its key
questions are debates about relative frequency, not matters
of logic or mechanism. In our immense and multifarious
world, issues of relative frequency are particularly difficult
to resolve.53
By way of illustration the next section gives a brief account of
the evolution of the tort of seduction.54 In the course of the last
three hundred years the tort, like society, has been through periods
of radical change. As the changes have come through both common
law and legislative action, their record provides a useful data set for
testing the speculations set forth above.
II. SEDUCTION
The earliest version of the modem tort of seduction grew out of
the writ of per quod servitium amissit. It was an action by a father for
the loss of the services of his daughter through pregnancy caused by
52. It has been argued that on controversial issues the reverse is true. See Con-
kle, Nonoriginalist Constitutional Rights and the Problem of Judicial Finality, 13 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 9, 32 n.97 (1985) (quotingJustice Traynor: "Legislators have become
astute at turning a deaf ear to highly visible issues on which they do not wish to
gamble their professional lives." Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 63 IowA L.
REV. 1, 8 (1977)). In such a situation the judge still must decide; the legislator can
wait. But controversy is by definition not the situation demanding an immediate
specific change; a wide range of variants to choose from once the situation has
settled is the evolutionary ideal.
53. Gould, supra note 20, at 18.
54. For a more detailed history of the law of seduction and the selective con-
trols on its development, see Sinclair, Seduction and the Myth of the Ideal Woman,
(forthcoming) 5 LAW & INEQUALITY - (1986).
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seduction. 5 The origins of the tort appear to have been con-
strained mainly by the range of available forms of actions. Basing
seduction on loss of services was, then, "a reasonable fiction ...
merely to bring the matter into court."5 In this form the tort
crossed the Atlantic to the United States57 where the common-law
courts meddled with it only marginally.58
When a woman was essentially a servant in her father's house-
hold, working at his command and for his benefit, any interruption
of her ability to work would be an injury to her father. Thus a preg-
nancy, the result of seduction, appropriately begot a civil remedy for
the father against the seducer for that injury.59 Virtue was not in-
volved, nor the father's honor; nor was the woman's willingness or
prior promiscuity a defense.6 0 The injury was essentially economic
and was to the father, who lost the services of a valuable economic
object-his daughter. As she suffered no loss, the seduced daughter
could not herself have a cause of action. 6' She, and not her father,
could however recover for breach of promise to marry: marriage
was a young woman's highest aspiration; given that she might have
some choice in this change of master, it was also her main chance of
advancement. 62
In the new United States, women, although still valued for their
services, were accorded higher status and more respect than they
were in England at that time. Here they were not merely of eco-
nomic value; shortness of supply in pioneering communities made
women much sought after as wives and accordingly more highly es-
55. Norton v.Jason, 82 Eng. Rep. 809 (K.B. 1653); Satterthwaite v. Dewhurst,
99 Eng. Rep. 899 (K.B. 1785).
56. Revill v. Sattergit, 171 Eng. Rep. 301 (1816).
57. E.g., Stout v. Prall, I N.J.L. 93 (1791).
58. E.g., VanHorn v. Freeman, 6 N.J.L. 322 (1796); Martin v. Payne, 9Johns.
387 (N.Y. 1812).
59. Once married she became the property of her husband and the tort became
criminal conversation instead of seduction. See Lippman, The Breakdown of Consor-
tium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651 (1930); Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on Heart Balm, 33
MICH. L. REV. 979 (1935).
60. Wallace v. Clarke, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 93 (1807); Akerley v. Haines, 2 Cai.
R. 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); Drish v. Davenport, 2 Stew. 266 (Ala. 1830). However
if the evidence of "prior unchastity" were offered solely to reduce special damages
for emotional distress then it might be admitted, Wallace v. Clarke, Arkerle, v. Haines,
but such evidence would have to be of reputation rather than actual promiscuity,
Drish v. Davenport.
61. Not until 1977 did a common-law court without statutory or constitutional
assistance uphold an action by the seduced woman. See Breece v. Jett, 556 S.W.2d
696 (Mo. App. 1977). As late as 1966 the Texas Court of Appeals refused to take
the step: "The Courts of this state seem committed to the rule that the seduced
female may not maintain a civil action against her seducer for the seduction alone."
Robinson v. Moore, 408 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
62. "Marriage to a woman especially, is an advancement or preferment ......
Holcroft v. Dickenson, 124 Eng. Rep. 933, 934 (C.P. 1672).
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teemed."3 The common-law tort was preserved in all its elements,
but the element of services was diminished virtually to a token, and
damages clearly based on injury to honor became normal. "He
[plaintiff] comes into the court as a master-he goes before the jury
as a father."64 Still the woman could not sue for her own seduction;
only the father or a person in his position could be plaintiff.65
By the middle of the nineteenth century the ideal conception of
women had changed. Now the young woman of middle to upper
class society was believed to be frail, incapable of working, an essen-
tially decorative companion of the financially aggressive male. 66
Virginity was highly prized: in the popular literature of the time its
loss other than in marriage led to moral and physical collapse-even
death.67 The ideal Victorian woman performed no valuable services
for her father; on the contrary her role led her to dissipate rather
than generate wealth.68
Clearly the common-law tort was utterly inappropriate when
women were thus conceived.69 Seduction may cause injury to the
63. V. KLEIN, FEMININE CHARACTER 7-10 (1946); E. DEXTER, COLONIAL WOMEN
OF AFFAIRS (1931) and CAREER WOMEN OF AMERICA 1776-1840 (1950); Lerner, The
Lady and the Mill Girl: Changes in the Status of Women in the Age ofJackson, 1800-1840,
10 MIDCONTINENT AM. STUD. J. 5 (1969); Vicinus, Introduction: The Perfect Victorian
Lady, in SUFFER AND BE STILL: WOMEN IN THE VICTORIAN AGE vii-ix (Vicinus ed.
1972); J. MESICK, THE ENGLISH TRAVELER IN AMERICA: 1785-1835 83-99 (1922).
64. Briggs v. Evans, 27 N.C. 16, 20 (1844). A similar trend also developed in
England, but in the United States judges tended to be more forthright in dealing
with the irrational aspects of the tort. See, e.g., McLure v. Miller, 11 N.C. 133
(1825).
65. The earliest and most acceptable plaintiff, other than the father, was a wid-
owed mother. See Coon v. Moffitt, 3 N.J.L. 169, 175-83 (1809) (Justice Pen-
nington's opinion is a textbook of the law of seduction at that time.); Keller v.
Donnelly, 5 Md. 211 (1853). Also accepted were a brother, Millar v. Thompson, 1
Wend. 447, 9 N.Y.C.L. Rep 976 (1828) (but plaintiff failed to prove that he lost
actual services of his 22-year-old sister); a cousin, Davidson v. Goodall, 18 N.H. 423
(1846); and a brother-in-law, Wilson v. Sproul, 3 Pen. & W. 49 (Pa. 1831).
66. "The attributes of True Womanhood, by which a woman judged herself
and was judged by her husband, her neighbors and society could be divided into
four cardinal virtues-piety, purity, submissiveness and domesticity." Welter, The
Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18 AM. Q. 151, 152 (1966); see also Lerner, supra
note 63; Vicinus, supra note 63; Smith-Rosenberg, Beauty the Beast, and the M1ilitant
Woman, 23 AM. Q. 562 (1971); Cott, Passionlessness: An Interpretation of Victorian Sexual
Ideology, 1790-1850, 4 SIGNS 219 (1978).
67. Welter, supra note 66. This oft-cited article is a fascinating documentation
of the morality prevailing in the popular magazines and books of the period.
68. Woman's primary function was to consume, conspicuously, the house-
hold's wealth-"to put in evidence her economic unit's ability to pay." T. VEBLEN,
THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 70-71 (1899). See also Smith-Rosenberg & Ro-
senberg, The Female Animal: Medical and Biological Views of Woman and Her Role in
Nineteenth-Century America, 60 J. AM. HIST. 332 (1973) and the works cited at supra
note 66.
69. It should be emphasized that this is the popular conception, realized in
only the wealthier American families; the lot of the poor woman was quite different.
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honor of the victim's father, but it certainly did not cause an eco-
nomic loss of consequence. Yet the young woman, morally impec-
cable but intellectually and motivationally inferior, could so easily
fall victim to the seductive wiles of man. Her injury, the loss of "that
priceless jewel that is the peculiar badge of the virtuous unmarried
female,"70 was catastrophic to her, but noncompensable. Not sur-
prisingly, the tort then began to be modified.
Between 1846 and 1913 nineteen legislatures revised the com-
mon-law tort of seduction.7' Typically these statutes eliminated the
requirement of alleging and proving the loss of services and/or ex-
pressly extended the right of action to the seduced woman.7 2 Se-
duction thus became, in these states, a tort primarily involving
virtue, not economics. Virtue, not services, was the primary value of
the young Victorian woman. Accordingly the woman's prior lack of
chastity became a defense in seduction actions.73 Damage awards
too were freed from their old supposed economic basis."4
At common law the tort made no such strides. There were no
judicial extensions of the right of action to the woman herself,75
although quite clearly it was recognized that she, and not her father,
suffered the injury. A new rittionale more in tune with the morality
of the times justified this stasis. No longer was the seduced woman
the servant whose services were lost rather than the one who lost
those services; 76 now she was barred because she had consented to
the act.7 7 Being in pari delicto she was precluded by the doctrine of
Yet it was the middle-to-upper class conception that formed the ideal: poverty of
course forced a mode of life that was less than ideal.
70. Gover v. Dill, 3 Iowa 337, 344 (1856).
71. ALA. CODE tit. 1, ch. 1, § 2133 (1852); ALASKA COMP. LAWS tit. XII, ch. 3,
§ 864 (1913); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 375 (1872); GA. CODE § 2951 (1861); IDAHO
REV. STAT. § 4097 (1887); IND. STAT. ch. 1, §§ 24, 25 (1852); IOWA CODE tit. 19,
§ 1696 (1851); Ky. STAT. ch. 1, § 2 (1873); MICH. COMP. LAWs §§ 6195-97 (1946);
MIss. CODE §§ 1508, 1509 (1880); MONT. CIv. CODE §§ 11, 12 (1877); NEV. CODE
CIV. PRAC. §§ 52, 53 (1911); OR. CODE CIv. PROC. tit. III, ch. 1, §§ 35, 36 (1887);
S.D. CIV. CODE §§ 2801, 2802 (1858); UTAH CODE CIV. PROC. tit. 1, §§ 231, 232
(1884); VA. CODE ch. 148, § 1 (1849); WASH. CODE §§ 10, 11 (1881); W. VA. CODE
ch. 148, § 1 (1860).
72. In some states (Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Nevada, Tennessee, and
Utah) this was restricted to adult women, minors still being dependent on parent or
guardian.
73. Gover v. Dill, 3 Iowa 337, 343 (1856).
74. Fourteen states (Alabama, Alaska, California, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Tennessee, South Dakota, Utah, and Washing-
ton) expressly provided in their statutes for damages assessed independently of the
value of services lost.
75. See supra note 61. In North Carolina courts, reform was achieved, but only
with the aid of a state constitutional ban on "feigned issues." N.C. CONST. art. IV,
§ 1; Hood v. Sudderth, 111 N.C. 215, 16 S.E. 397 (1892).
76. Roper v. Clay, 18 Mo. 383 (1853).
77. "[She cannot] maintain an action for such seduction, because the person
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volenti non fit injuria.78
This new rationale could be used effectively to vary other as-
pects of the tort.79 Whereas the woman's consent was previously
irrelevant, now judges began allowing evidence of it and of her prior
lack of chastity in defense.8" Whereas the defendant's promise to
marry, as a seductive artifice, was previously inadmissible as irrele-
vant, now it became a commonplace part of plaintiff's case. 81
Clearly judges were finding a way to fit the dominant moral themes
demanded by society into the structure of the tort derived from pre-
cedent. Historical forms, such as a showing of services lost,8 2 had to
be satisfied, but present values had to determine the result. The
strain on the classical theory was readily apparent in damage
awards: little attempt was made to tie them to loss of services (the
supposed basis of the damage) and evidence of the defendant's
wealth along with the plaintiff's (and the woman's) loss of honor
and emotional suffering were admissible to help the jury determine
punitive damages. 83
seduced assents thereto." Hamilton v. Lomax, 26 Barb. 615, 617 (1858). This
idea, however nonsensical, has been remarkably long lived. See Oberlin v. Upson,
84 Ohio St. 111, 95 N.E. 511 (1911); Golly v. Thomas, 99 Misc. 158, 163 N.Y.S. 432
(1917); Hutchins v. Day, 269 N.G. 607, 153 S.E.2d 132 (1967).
78. Hamilton v. Lomax, 26 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 615 (1858); Golly v. Thomas, 99 Misc.
158, 163 N.Y.S. 432 (1917); Kirkpatrick v. Parker, 136 Fla. 689, 187 So. 620 (1939);
Thibault v. Lalumiere, 318 Mass. 72, 60 N.E.2d 349 (1945); Hutchins v. Day, 269
N.C. 607, 153 S.E.2d 132 (1967). One would expect that a rape victim could her-
self bring an action for seduction and this in fact was the case: Kennedy v. Shea,
110 Mass. 147 (1872); Dalman v. Koning, 54 Mich. 320, 20 N.W. 61 (1884);
Monahan v. Clemons, 212 Ky. 504, 279 S.W. 974 (1926).
79. Clearlyjudges were struggling to find a way to justify a decision fitting the
cause of action as it had come down to them in the precedents; now, however, the
original rationales no longer applied. So long as one does not have to juxtapose
too many contradictory elements in the one opinion, expediency is effective, at least
for a reasonable time. This is the essence of the evolutionary process in law.
80. Lalyer v. Fritcher, 130 N.Y. 239, 29 N.E. 267 (1891); White v. Nellis, 31
Barb. 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 1859), aff'd, 31 N.Y. 405 (1865); White v. Murtland, 71
Ill. 250 (1874); Finch v. Gibson, 140 Tenn. 134, 203 S.W. 759 (1918); Owens v.
Fanning, 205 S.W. 69 (Mo. App. 1918).
81. Bell v. Rinker, 29 Ind. 267 (1868); Smith v. Young, 26 Mo. App. 575
(1887); Franklin v. McCorkle, 84 Tenn. 609, 1 S.W. 250 (1886); Falkner v. Schultz,
160 Wis. 594, 150 N.W. 424 (1915); Rockwell v. Day, 101 Wash. 580, 172 P. 754
(1918); Comer v. Taylor, 82 Mo. 341 (1884). Confusion of seduction and breach of
promise to marry also became common. Litchliter v. Russell, 89 Ill. App. 62
(1899); M. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 45-49 (1985).
82. Abrahams v. Kidney, 104 Mass. 222 (1870); Wendt v. Lentz, 197 Wis. 569,
222 N.W. 798 (1929); Blagge v. Ilsley, 127 Mass. 191 (1879); Greenwood v. Green-
wood, 28 Md. 369 (1867); Mohry v. Hoffman, 86 Pa. 358 (1878); Simpson v. Gray-
son, 54 Ark. 404, 16 S.W. 4 (1891); Beaudette v. Gagne, 87 Me. 534, 33 A. 23
(1895); Tillotson v. Currin, 176 N.C. 479, 97 S.E. 395 (1918).
83. Lavery v. Crooke, 52 Wis. 612, 9 N.W. 599 (1881); Graham v. Smith, 46
Tenn. App. 549, 330 S.W.2d 573 (1959); Marshall v. Taylor, 8 Cal. 55, 32 P. 867
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It was not until the 1920s that the social conception of the ideal
woman changed again in any relevant way. The campaign for suf-
frage of the first two decades of this century was based not on wo-
men's equality but on the value of those very differences that so
dominated Victorian sex roles.84 The 1920s wrought an unprece-
dented transformation in American social behavior.8 5 Most of all it
was a decade of revolution in sexual mores.86 By the end of the
decade the Victorian morality of "sexual purity and sacrifice" for
women87 had been abandoned in favor of a new equalitarian view.
Women sought and, to a marked extent, achieved substantially the
same sexual freedom that had previously been enjoyed only by
men.
8 8
Such a sexual revolution had to have an impact on seduction
along with the other heart balm actions. A person, fully autono-
mous sexually, could scarcely be victimized by the seductive wiles of
men. Yet it was not until 1935 that this effect took hold of the tort
of seduction, and even then it did so remarkably ineffectually. Only
ten states enacted statutes abolishing the tort of seduction prior to
the end of World War II,9 although more than double that number
(1893); Haessig v. Decker, 139 Minn. 422, 166 N.W. 1085 (1918); Dwire v. Stearns,
44 N.D. 199, 172 N.W. 69 (1919); Eller v. Lord, 36 S.D. 377, 154 N.W. 816 (1915).
84. S. ROTHMAN, WOMAN'S PROPER PLACE 127 (1978); Harper, Would Woman
Suffrage Benefit the State, and Woman Herself., 178 N. AM. REV. 362 (1904); T.C. CLAF-
LIN, CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY, A RIGHT OF WOMAN 63 (1871); A. KRADITOR, THE
IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFERAGE MOVEMENT 1890-1920 43-74 (1965).
85. P. FASS, THE DAMNED AND THE BEAUTIFUL: AMERICAN YOUTH IN THE
1920's 3 (1977).
86. "Students of modem sexual behaviour have quite correctly described the
twenties as a turning point, a critical juncture between the strict double standard of
the age of Victoria and the permissive sexuality of the age of Freud." Id at 260.
This was a period of "immense preoccupation with sex," in literature, conversation,
and behavior. W. LIPPMAN, A PREFACE To MORALS 285 (1929). See also W. CHAFE,
THE AMERICAN WOMAN: HER CHANGING SOCIAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ROLES,
1920-1970 94-95 (1972); R. LYND & H. LYND, MIDDLETOWN 138 (1929). It was also
the period during which contraception was successfully introduced to the American
woman. D. KENNEDY, BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA: THE CAREER OF MARGARET
SANGER (1970). Walter Lippman argued that contraception was a prime cause of
the sexual liberation of women in the 1920s. W. LIPPMAN, supra at 288. Margaret
Sanger argued that the role of contraception in "free[ing] the mind of sexual preju-
dice and taboo [was] ... most important of all." M. SANGER, PIVOT OF CIVILIZATION
244 (1922).
87. C. SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT 295 (1985).
88. S. ROTHMAN, supra note 84, at 177; W. CHAFE, supra note 86, at 94-95.
89. Alabama: Act of Sept. 7, 1935, No. 356, 1935 Ala. Acts 780 (codified at
ALA. CODE § 6-5-331 (1977)). Illinois: Heart Balm Act, 1935 Ill. Laws 716 (codi-
fied at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 246.1-246.6 (1937)) (found unconstitutional
under Illinois Constitution in Heck v. Schupp, 394 Il. 296, 63 N.E.2d 464 (1946)),
re-enacted in revised form 1947 Il. Laws 796-800, 1181 (codified at ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 40, 1801-10, 1901-10, 1951-60 (Smith-Hurd 1980)). Indiana: Heart Balm
Act, ch. 208, 1935 Ind. Acts 1009 (codified at IND. CODE § 34-4-4-1 (1982)). Michi-
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entertained such bills.9" Four of the statutes that were enacted pre-
served the tort for minor women, persons still considered not fully
capable. 91
What prevented a more general abolition to match the newly
achieved sexual equality of women? Women may have achieved
equality in some specifically sexual respects, but in other respects
they had made no progress.92 They still depended economically
and socially on men, and their diminished status was reinforced by
the difficulties of the depression.93 Unless and until women were
seen as fully equal to men in other respects, they would not be seen
as fully equal sexually. In the 1930s women were not seen as gener-
ally equal. This is exemplified by the language with which the Flor-
ida Supreme Court justified its denial of the cause of action to the
woman: she had failed to allege "undue influence, force, duress or
other overpowering influence or dominating or fiduciary control
over her by the defendant, and there is no direct allegation that the
defendant promised to marry the plaintiff."94 All these factors per-
tain to ways that, in the popular conception, women were thought to
be inferior to men. Seduction by promise to marry95 was still differ-
entially heinous: to woman marriage was a primary goal, by manip-
ulation of which she might easily be exploited; to man it was a part,
gan: Act of June 3, 1935, No. 127, 1935 Mich. Pub. Acts 201 (codified at MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2901 (West 1986); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2901 (Calla-
ghan 1980)). NewJersey: Act ofJune 27, 1935, ch. 279, 1935 NJ. Laws 896 (codi-
fied at NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:23-1 to 23-6 (West 1952). New York: Act of Mar. 29,
1935, ch. 263, 1935 N.Y. Laws 732, repealed by 1962 N.Y. Laws 1297, 1549 (codified
at N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 10,001 (McKinney 1981)), re-enacted in revised form
1962 N.Y. Laws 1650, 1677 (codified at N.Y. Civ. RIGrTS LAW § 80-a to 84 (McKin-
ney 1976). Pennsylvania: Act ofJune 22, 1935, No. 189, 1935 Pa. Laws 452 (codi-
fied at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §§ 170-77 (Purdon 1965)). Colorado followed in
1937: Act of Apr. 27, 1937, ch. 11, 1937 Colo. Sess. Laws 403 (codified at COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 13-20-201 to 13-20-208 (1974)). Massachusetts followed in 1938:
Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 350, 1938 Mass. Acts 326 (codified at MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.
207, § 47A (Law Co-op. 1981)) (abolished only breach of contract to marry). Cali-
fornia followed in 1939: Act of May 10, 1939, ch. 129, § 1-4, 1939 Cal. Stat. 1245
(codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 49, 374, and 375 (West 1982)). Florida followed at
the end of World War I: Act of June 11, 1945, ch. 23, 138 (No. 624), 1945 Fla.
Laws I (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 771.01 to 771.08 (West 1964).
90. States that introduced anti-heart balm statutes in 1935 but failed to enact
them prior to the war include Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas,
Washington, and Wisconsin (14 states!). Feinsinger, supra note 59, at 997-98.
91. Alabama, California, Indiana, and Michigan.
92. R. LYND & H. LYND, MIDDLETOWN IN TRANSITION 176-80 (1937);J. LEMONS,
THE WOMAN CITIZEN: SOCIAL FEMINISM IN THE 1920s 228-44 (1973).
93. S. ROTHMAN, supra note 84, at 221; W. CHAFE, supra note 86, at 107-09; S.
BECKER, THE ORIGINS OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: AMERICAN FEMINISM BE-
TWEEN THE WARS 6 (1981).
94. Kirkpatrick v. Parker, 136 Fla. 689, 697, 187 So. 620, 623-24 (1939).
95. Id. See also Seamons v. Spackman, 81 Idaho 361, 341 P.2d 442 (1959).
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butjust a part, of the normal life. Thus the very limited effect of the
sexual revolution of the 1920s on the law of seduction is hardly sur-
prising. The acknowledgement of normal sexuality did very little,
on its own, for the popular conception of women as inferior to men.
After World War II the intensive and deliberate efforts to re-
verse women's progress had a predictable effect on the law of seduc-
tion. Nothing happened except a slight increase in litigation. The
success of this atavism was well illustrated in 1950 by a New Jersey
Supreme Court decision allowing a seduction action notwithstand-
ing its legislative abolition in 1935.96
The period from 1965 through 1975 saw women take giant
strides toward equality.9 7 By the late 1970s women were generally
viewed as independent, sexually, socially and economically autono-
mous, and quite the equal of men.98 Predictably another round of
legislation began in the mid-1970s and by 1983 nine more states
had abolished seduction as a cause of action.99 Although the cause
of action remains theoretically available in more than thirty states, it
96. Blackman v. Iles, 4 N.J.L. 82, 71 A.2d 633 (1950).
97. S. ROTHMAN, supra note 84, at 218, 231-42; W. CHAFE, supra note 86, at 227-
37; J. FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION 26-31 (1975); C. BIRD,
BORN FEMALE: THE HIGH COST OF KEEPING WOMEN DOWN Chapter 1 (1968); R.
TANNAHILL, SEX IN HISTORY 406-20 (1980).
98. "The woman of today is not the woman of yesteryear. She has a new-found
freedom. The modern adult woman is sophisticated and mature. The former no-
tion that women belong to the weaker sex has long been abandoned. The modem
woman is not 'easily beguiled' and does not easily fall to the 'wiles' of man. Women
desire and should be held to a reasonable responsibility." Breece v. Jett, 556
S.W.2d 696, 708 (Mo. App. 1977). See also S. ROTHMAN, supra note 84, at 241-42.
99. In 1975, Delaware and Oregon: Act ofJuly 5, 1972, ch. 489, 58 Del. Laws
1601 (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3924 (1975)); Act of July 2, 1975, ch.
562, 1975 Or. Laws 1285 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.840, 30.850 (1983)). In
1976, Oklahoma: Act of May 31, 1976, ch. 164, 1976 Okla. Sess. Laws 230 (codi-
fied at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 8.1 (West Supp. 1984-85)). In 1977, Virginia and
Wyoming: Act of Apr. 1, 1977, ch. 617, § 2, 1977 Va. Acts 1052, 1083 (codified at
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-220 (1984)); Act of Mar. 10, 1977, ch. 24, § 1, 1977 Wyo.
Sess. Laws 771, 871-72 (codified at Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-23-101 to 1-23-104 (1977)).
In 1978, Minnesota and Ohio: Act of Mar. 23, 1978, ch. 515, 1978 Minn. Laws 141
(codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 553.01 to 553.03 (West Supp. 1985)); Act of Mar.
8, 1978, ch. 137, 1978 Ohio Laws 2225 (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2305.29 (Anderson 1981)). In 1979, Georgia: Act of Apr. 4, 1979, No. 86, § 46,
1979 Ga. Laws 466, 496-97 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-17 (1982), see also
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-16 (1982)). In 1983, North Dakota: Act of Apr. 14, 1983,
ch. 172, § 9, 1983 N.D. Laws 441, 445-46 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-06
(Supp. 1985)). Ohio and Oklahoma preserved the cause of action for minor wo-
men and women of unsound mind. Washington and Alaska, which had both previ-
ously passed statutes liberalizing the cause of action, amended their statutes to
inhibit its future use; Washington also made its statute gender neutral. Act of Apr.
24, 1973, ch. 154, §§ 5, 121, 1973 Wash. Laws 1118, 1125, 1197-98 (amending
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.020 and repealing WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.030); Act of
May 17, 1974, ch. 127, § 64, 1974 Alaska Sess. Laws 1, 12 (repealing ALASKA STAT.
§ 9.15.030).
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seems at present to have atrophied, perhaps even to extinction. Yet
common law judges have shown a remarkable reluctance in this re-
spect. Even while making the revolutionary (100 years overdue) ex-
tension of the right of action to the woman and acknowledging that
"an action for seduction is socially unwise in modem society," Chief
Judge Simeone of the Missouri Court of Appeals could not see his
way clear to the final step of abolition.'00
III. SEDUCTION AND EVOLUTION
The preceding section explained the tort of seduction as a func-
tion of the social conception of the ideal woman. In evolutionary
terms, the myth of the ideal woman prevailing at a given time gener-
ates the selective criteria for adaptive development in the law of
seduction.
This myth is not an underlying principle of morality compelling
or inhibiting behavior; rather it is an ideal, an image, with which the
concept of seduction-and who suffers injury thereby-may or may
not be compatible. It is determined by the general social mores of a
society. Accordingly one would expect, and finds, a systematic rela-
tionship between the conception of women and the perceived neces-
sities of the time. Courts and legislatures both acted so as to effect
the necessary adaptation, but they acted in strikingly different ways.
In the mid-nineteenth century when the ideal conception of wo-
men changed from the economically useful possession to the angelic
and decorative, but frail, princess, legislatures were able to react by
completely changing the tort. The right of action was extended to
the seduced woman herself, and for the critical injury: loss of virtue.
In short, the legislatures were able to revolutionize the tort. The
courts, on the other hand, only tinkered with the elements of the old
cause of action; they reduced the quantum of services that plaintiff
father had to prove, but did not eliminate it altogether; they permit-
ted damages quite unrelated to actual services lost, but did not
abandon the fiction that the damages were based on services lost;
they permitted plaintiff to explain defendant's seductive artifice, but
only to avoid the defense of in pani delicto; conversely, they enter-
tained, as a defense, a showing of the woman's prior lack of chastity.
Thus the courts transformed the details of the tort to make it work
adequately enough in the new environment, but they never took the
whole step of redesigning it. This was a truly evolutionary process.
A similar bifurcation of adaptive processes occurred in the
twentieth century. With the emerging equality of women, the pa-
tronizing protection of seduction law became increasingly offensive.
Nineteen legislatures reacted by abolishing the cause of action, but
some six of these preserved it for minors and mental incompetents
100. Breece v. Jett, 556 S.W.2d 696, 708 (Mo. App. 1977).
1987]
468 UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 64:451
who still might need protection. No court to date has followed
these legislatures in abolishing the tort. It took until 1977 for a
court to follow the nineteenth century legislatures in extending the
right of action to the seduced woman. Again the legislatures were
able to make revolutionary-designed-adaptations while the
courts, in the few opportunities available to them, continued their
evolutionary tinkering.
From the history of seduction we can deduce some features of
our lawmaking mechanisms that tend to promote evolutionary
rather than revolutionary processes. 10' First a court must await a
suitable opportunity to make a change. Trial courts obviously get
the most opportunities and, equally obviously, are the least likely to
take advantage of them. Even when they do make changes, trial
court opinions are usually not recorded and disseminated, so they
have little impact unless appealed. In causes like seduction where
the stakes are seldom very high,'0 2 the number of cases to reach a
state supreme court is likely to be small.' 0 3 A supreme court is likely
to respond to appellate activity as indicative of a need for change; a
paucity of chances to make a change indicates exactly the opposite.
The small value and the appearance of a settled state of the law is
also likely to have an impact on the bar: clients are not going to be
encouraged to make appeals against apparent odds for small stakes.
In these ways, the structural features of the courts and access to
them create an inertia of their own in causes of action like seduction.
The system of state law in the United States presents a further
inhibition to overt development of common law. As societal values
changed and seduction became more implausible as a cause of ac-
tion, not only did reported appellate cases become less frequent,
but many state legislatures abolished the tort. Oddly enough, while
one common-law jurisdiction might take seriously a judicial devel-
opment in another, if that development comes by way of legislation
it tends to be ignored. 04 Had the legislature not stepped in, the
courts of New York might well have eliminated seduction as a cause
101. Of course these features remain hypotheses that can be tested in evolution-
ary explanations of other areas of law.
102. The highest recorded in an appeal in the United States is $25,000. Eller v.
Lord, 36 S.D. 377, 154 N.W. 816 (1915).
103. As of 1977, "In the whole history of the State of Missouri there have been
only nineteen appellate decisions for seduction." Breece v. Jett, 556 S.W.2d 696,
706-07 (Mo. App. 1977). This count included Boedges v. Dinges, 428 S.W.2d 930
(Mo. App. 1968), a breach of promise action; otherwise the most recent had been
Owens v. Fanning, 205 S.W. 69 (Mo. App. 1918).
104. J. LANDIS, STATUTES AND THE SOURCES OF LAW, HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213,
230-33 (1934). Where change has come elsewhere by statute it is all too easy to see
such change as a legislative prerogative; in the extreme "the statute itself is a datum
which reinforces the fact that the overruled decision is evidence of the common
law, and so error perpetuates itself." Id. at 231.
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of action, and thus persuaded many other courts to follow suit. But
the action of the New York and other state legislatures prevented
such a course, leaving the common law development to those states
generating fewer cases and consequently less felt tension.'0 5 In all
these respects legislatures contrast with courts. It would thus ap-
pear much easier for a conceptual change in law, responding to a
development in society, to come through a legislature than through
common-law courts. The history of seduction bears out this
contention.
The subject matter of the law in question should also have a
strong influence on whether the old law will be perpetuated with
minor adjustments or replaced by new law. In areas in which a per-
son is likely to plan actions carefully and with legal advice, there is a
strong incentive for lawmakers to maintain, as nearly as possible, the
status quo ante. For example, Lord Mansfield wrote: "In all mercan-
tile transactions the great object should be certainty: and therefore,
it is of more consequence that a rule should be certain, than whether
the rule is established one way or the other. Because speculators in
trade then know what ground to go upon."'0 6 Thus we would ex-
pect the law governing negotiable instruments to be precise and sta-
ble,10 7 but the law governing transactions in goods to be variable
according to the context.10 8 This expectation is born out in the pre-
vailing law. 10 9 Presumably, one does not consult one's lawyer
before committing a tort such as battery or seduction. Notice of the
law in such areas of behavior comes from prevailing social stan-
dards, and accordingly the law can more freely adapt to changes in
those standards. That the common law of seduction was so slow to
adapt is indicative of the strength of the retentive pressure exerted
on judges by precedent.
It would seem that social systems are capable of absorbing a
considerable amount of stress" 0 before they precipitate a need for
change. Legislatures seem to act only when such needs become, or
105. The practical effect of this inertia built into our common-law system is con-
trary to the arguments of Rubin, supra note 5, and Priest, supra note 5. See i'fra text
accompanying notes 115-18.
106. Vallejo v. Wheeler, 1 Cowp. 143, 153, 98 Eng. Rep. 1012, 1017 (K.B.
1774).
107. It is of critical importance that a negotiable instrument be easily and indu-
bitably recognizable as such.
108. Most transactions in goods-the purchases of newspapers, ice creams, gro-
ceries, etc.-are between persons who neither know of nor care about Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, and surely do not consult it.
109. Compare the sections of the U.C.C. defining negotiable instruments,
U.C.C. 3-104 to 3-122, with those defining transactions in goods, U.C.C. 2-102 to
2-107.
110. This felicitous expression was used by Stephen Jay Gould in a television
interview, "This View of Life," Nova #1118, first broadcast December 18, 1984,
Transcripts at 8.
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appear to have become, comparatively urgent. Courts are less pres-
sured because society is able to absorb a wide difference between its
prevailing values and the extant "common law rule" simply by not
bringing suits, or by limiting damage awards when such suits are
brought. As dissemination of overt changes in common-law rules
comes only through reported appellate opinions, the chances for
public acknowledgement of such changes are commensurately
reduced. "'
Again, the evolution of the tort of seduction is illustrative. Leg-
islatures responded reasonably quickly and appropriately to the
changes in society by designing a new tort or completely abolishing
the old one. Common-law courts did not. Thejudges stretched and
distorted the old tort where they could, but did not abandon it.
This can be seen most clearly in the refusal of the courts to allow the
seduced woman a right of action. Despite the shift in basis from the
economics of services to the morality of virtue and honor, despite
the actions of legislatures in other jurisdictions, the courts refused
to modify the traditional seventeenth and eighteenth century parties
to the tort. Even those courts, such as Florida's, that flirted with an
extension' 12 stayed safely within the ancient boundaries.' 1 3 Absent
a statutory or constitutional boost, only one court could see its way
clear to according the right of action to the seduced woman, and
that was not until 1977. 14
This history is an apparent counter-example to the evolutionary
theory of Priest" 5 and Rubin." 6 They argue that common-law
cases brought under rules that do not accord with societal demands
will be appealed more often, thus forcing the more frequent revision
of those rules. 1 7 Yet here we see an old and relatively maladapted
rule remaining solidly in place through the period of greatest activ-
ity, only to be changed long after the cause of action had fallen into
disuse. Apparently the forces of precedent hold more sway with the
judiciary, even in relatively active times, than do the less tangible
111. Thus as an "intermediate appellate court," the Missouri Court of Appeals,
did not feel empowered to abolish the tort in Breece v. Jett, 556 S.W.2d 696, 708
(Mo. App. 1977); had the value of the judgment warranted a further appeal, per-
haps we would have seen a common law abolition.
112. Kirkpatrick v. Parker, 136 Fla. 689, 187 So. 620 (1939).
113. See also Van de Velde v. Colle, 8 N.J. Misc. 782, 152 A. 645 (Union County
Ct. 1931); Shaw v. Fletcher, 138 Fla. 103, 189 So. 678 (1939); Collis v. Hoskins,
306 Ky. 391, 208 S.W.2d 70 (1948); Whitman v. Sarmento, 10 Chest. 27, 22 D. &
C.2d 384 (Pa. Comm. P1. 1960).
114. Breece v. Jett, 556 S.W.2d 696, 708 (Mo. App. 1977).
115. Priest, supra note 5.
116. Rubin, supra note 5.
117. Rubin and Priest, being economists, argue that this will be when the rules
distribute burdens inefficiently-that is, fail to maximize total profit. The argument
is the same for noneconomic social mores.
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demands of social mores. Stare decisis, especially in the face of pos-
sible legislative action, has been a very powerful force in the com-
mon law development of seduction. An evolutionary theory is thus
very apt: the processes of variation and selection occur responsively
to environmental pressures but always constrained by the shape of
the old organism, the classical common-law tort of seduction."'
IV. EXPLANATORY VALUE OF EVOLUTION THEORY IN LAW
To be of value a hypothesis must be capable of being falsi-
fied. " 9 The point is especially pertinent to evolutionary theories of
law. If you identify that to which the law adapts only by the light of
the variant selected by the lawmaker, you will always be right. On
such grounds, Gordon 120 has demonstrated that adaptationist theo-
ries in general are likely to be tautological. Kennedy121 has argued
that Clark's use of cost reduction as the explanation of corporate
form in particular is an example of this. 122 The problem has to be
taken seriously.
Biological evolution does not produce organisms perfectly
adapted to or maximally efficient in their environments.1 23 Nor
does evolution in law produce states of law that are optimally suited
118. Thus the common-law tort of seduction provides a striking legal example
of the "odd arrangements and funny solutions" that best illustrate evolution. S.
GOULD, supra note 25, at 20.
119. Legal Evolution, supra note 4, at 1258. The point is a standard one in the
philosophy of science; E. NAGLE, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE 52-56 (1961); K. Pop-
PER, THE LOGIC OF SCINTIFIC DISCOVERY 32-39 (English Edition, 1958). It is easy
to construct deceptively powerful looking but empty explanations of case law. For
example, suppose we hypothesize that all judging is a matter of cost benefit analysis
with the society's priorities measured, say, in utiles; the judge is the representative
of society charged with doing the analysis, including the assignment of utile values.
This will always work-the hypothesis will never be falsified. Similarly, the notion
of "gene-culture coevolution" as used, for example, by J. BECKSTROM, SOCIOBI-
OLOGY AND THE LAw 52 (1985), is so ill-contained that it explains everything, and so
nothing.
120. Gordon, supra note 26, at 1028-36.
121. Kennedy, supra note 26, at 1278 (commenting on Clark, Legal Evolution,
supra note 4.)
122. Id. at 1279.
[Clark] suggests that if merging businesses chose the corporate form, that
is evidence that the corporate form reduced costs. But that is good evi-
dence only if we define "utility" so that everyone always does what they do
in order to maximize utility. If Clark is not using a tautological definition,
then I'd like to hear him formulate some other possible explanation of the
choice of the corporate form, and then present some evidence that the
non-tautological cost-reduction hypothesis is more plausible than the
alternatives.
Id.
123. S. GOULD, supra note 25, at 19-26.
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to social requirements. 24 Legislation-a process of design-has
the potential to do so,125 but common law does not. The common-
law judge has only the old law to work with and can only stretch it so
many ways at a given opportunity. Common law thus works in an
evolutionary fashion to produce states of law that achieve most of
what is required, but in an indirect and less than perfect fashion.
This is the key to seeing that Gordon's and Kennedy's criticisms
of adaptationist theories do not apply to evolutionary theories. The
evolutionary process produces states of law that are predictably mal-
adaptive, but not necessarily in a predictable or systematic way.
Common-law seduction and its evolution is an example. It is not
possible to deduce a given state of common-law seduction from the
state of societal mores (or the conception of women in particular);
nor is it possible to deduce societal mores (or the conception of wo-
men) from the state of common-law seduction. Too many of the
features generated to suit the requirements of a previous age remain
with the cause of action. In this respect the analogy to biological
evolution is especially apt.
Clark, however, seems to have in mind finding factual data of a
kind that would falsify the particular candidate theory. 126 The pro-
ponent of an evolutionary theory of a particular body of law should
show what kind of data would falsify it, thus forestalling the charge
of tautology. With the evolutionary explanation of the tort of seduc-
tion this is rather easy.
In the recent history of seduction law we have two clear pieces
of data that do not fit the general explanation. In 1888 Maryland
enacted a statute' 27 expressly recognizing the common law cause of
action for seduction, just when other states were eliminating its
more anachronistic elements. This oddity remains in effect to this
day. 128 The other outstanding anomaly is Wisconsin's enactment in
1959 of a statute 29 abolishing all heart balm actions except seduc-
tion. The timing and the omission of seduction cannot be explained
124. See supra sections II and III.
125. Legislation could achieve optimal adaptation (to some environment, on
some criterion of optimality) at the time of enactment, although in the tort of se-
duction it tended to lag behind the times. However, in changing times, statutes can
and do very easily become dated, and ill fitted to social needs. See G. CALABRESI,
supra note 50, at 1-7.
126. Legal Evolution, supra note 4, at 1258-59. For example, he writes: "[T]he
person that formulated the particular explanation or theory is not in a good posi-
tion to look for and to see conflicting data." Id. at 1258.
127. MD. PUB. GEN. LAws art. 75, § 23 (1888).
128. MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 14 (1957) (repealed by Acts 1973, 1st Sp. Sess.,
ch. 2, § 2) "[forms of pleading are sufficient if they state] ... that the defendant
debauched and carnally knew the plaintiff's daughter and servant, whereby he lost
her service."
129. 1959 Wis. Laws ch. 595, § 73 (presently codified at Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 818.02 (West Supp. 1986)).
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by the analysis offered here.' Thus there is no need to imagine
what kind of data would falsify the evolutionary explanation of se-
duction: the data exists. But does this mean the explanation must,
ipsofacto, be rejected?
Such a limited failing is not fatal to a theory of human social
behavior; human organizations tend not to work with mathematical
precision. Relative frequency of occurrence, not theoretical impec-
cability, is at issue. If there were many more such falsifying exam-
ples, we would need to reassess the adequacy of this explanation.
And, of course, an explanation that accounted for these two states'
laws as well as all the other data would be superior.
With evolutionary explanations of other areas of law, the re-
quirement of potential falsifiability may not be as readily disposed of
as with seduction. The problem is not just one of providing a de-
scription of the sort of facts that would be contrary to the theory;
that is usually quite easy for all but the more superficial verbal theo-
ries."' Rather, the falsifying phenomena must have a plausible po-
tential for occurring with significant frequency.132  Potentially
falsifying facts of very little probability of actuality' 33 need not be
taken seriously. But how do we determine such probabilities, and
how do we tell whether a speculative frequency 3 4 of occurrence is
significant?
These are problems that are not unique to evolutionary theo-
ries of law. In many branches of science it is possible to use a theory
to make predictions and then to test those predictions by laboratory
experiment or statistical survey. So endemic is this procedure that it
is sometimes called "THE scientific method." But it is not a method
of any relevance to biological, geological, or legal evolution.13 5
Darwin saw this very point:
[H]e also deeply understood that the testing of historical
hypotheses could not always proceed by canonical methods
130. Yet it is inescapable that the Wisconsin legislature intended it: the most
recent amendment occurred in 1983 and provides that a seduction plaintiff who
prevails shall be awarded costs! 1983 Wis. Laws ch. 447, § 52 (presently codified at
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 814.01 (West Supp. 1986)).
131. Moliere provided the classic example with the explanation of the fact that
opium induces sleep in terms of its having a "dormative virtue."
132. Gould, supra note 20, at 18: "The issue is not plausibility but relative
frequency."
133. For example if gender roles in our society were reversed, the evolutionary
explanation of common law seduction would fail.
134. It has to be speculative: if counter-examples had already occurred with
significant frequency, the proposed theory would be simply wrong.
135. See Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 647-48. I have argued elsewhere that in
general theories of common law cannot be constructed on the model of "the scien-
tific method." Sinclair, The Semantics of Common Law Predicates, 61 IND. L.J. 373, 382-
86 (1985-86).
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of direct experiment and repetition. After all, historical
events occur over millions of years, and their complexity
confers uniqueness with no possibility for repetition (we
cannot re-create dinosaurs in the laboratory to test various
ideas about their extinction).1 3 6
Legal evolution does not take millions of years; in some areas we
can observe it in process. 137 However, the complexity and variety of
inputs into the selective process, the variety of lawmaking mecha-
nisms that can be used, and the variety of ways the law can be
adapted to changing conditions preclude predictive testing.
Of course it is still necessary that a formulation of an evolution-
ary explanation of law be falsifiable: this is simply a requirement of
its having empirical content. But it is not by formulating falsifiable
predictions and empirically testing them that we primarily evaluate
evolutionary theory. Rather, such a theory is evaluated by the range
of otherwise disparate data that it explains in a simple and unified
manner. Darwin saw this point also:
In scientific investigations it is permitted to invent any hy-
pothesis, and if it explains various large and independent
classes of facts it rises to the rank of a well-grounded the-
ory. . . . Now this hypothesis may be tested,-and this
seems to me the only fair and legitimate manner of consid-
ering the whole question,-by trying whether it explains
several large and independent classes of facts; such as the
geological succession of organic beings, their distribution
in past and present times, and their mutual affinities and
homologies. If the principle of natural selection does ex-
plain these and other large bodies of facts, it ought to be
received. 13 8
The present action of natural selection may seem more
or less probable; but I believe in the truth of the theory,
because it collects under one point of view, and gives a ra-
tional explanation of, many apparently independent classes
136. Gould, Soapy Sam's Logic, 95 NAT. HIST. #4, 16, 24 (Apr. 1986).
137. In the last thirty years we have seen dramatic changes in sexual and related
domestic morality, but have not yet seen a new, stable, and generally accepted posi-
tion in society. The decisions of the Supreme Court reflected this change, adapting
to the new morality, for many years: Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking
a miscegination statute); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (guaranteeing contraception to all); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (guaranteeing freedom of abortion). But any thought
of a general adaptation to the new morality was scotched in Bowers v. Hardwick,
106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (upholding Georgia's anti-sodomy statute). Here we can
observe legal evolution in process.
138. C. DARWIN, THE VARIATION OF ANIMALS AND PLANTS UNDER DOMESTICATION
20 (U.S. Edition, 1868).
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of facts.'8 9
So it is in biology, so too in law.
An important consequence is that particular examples of evolu-
tionary processes in law, such as that described in section II,
above, 14 cannot be taken alone as confirming or falsifying the the-
ory in general. What is required is a number of examples from quite
diverse areas of law.14 1
It is not difficult to find the kind of data that illustrate legal
evolution. Whenever one finds a legal fiction, 142 one has found the
kind of jury-rigged adaptation that characterizes evolutionary phe-
nomena. Traditional legal devices143 that survive despite their lack
of relevance in modem society similarly evidence evolutionary de-
velopment of law. Conversely, clever schemes devised to avoid un-
desirable restraints on operations14 4 illustrate practical adaptations
that leave the inherited rule unchallenged. It would seem that ex-
amples do, in fact, abound in all areas of the law.
V. CONCLUSION
Evolution theory has a useful role to play in explaining present
states of the law. A fully developed evolutionary analysis, including
a theory of retention/transmission as well as theories of variation
and selection, explains not just the adaptive features of the common
law but also the continued presence of maladaptive historical fea-
tures and, unlike simple adaptation theories, it does this without
tautology. In this it sharply distinguishes judicial lawmaking from
legislation in a perspicuous and productive way.
139. Id. at 25-26. Gould quotes a letter from Darwin to Hooker: "Change of
species cannot be directly proved .... The doctrine must sink or swim according
as it groups and explains phenomena. It is really curious how few judge it this way,
which is clearly the right way." Gould, supra note 136, at 25-26.
140. Or in Clark's The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution
and Reform, 87 YALE LJ. 90 (1977).
141. Thus it is of value that Clark's analysis is of tax law, and the above analysis
of seduction is of a relatively remote area of tort.
142. Legal fictions are evolutionary devices that have been in use for centuries.
Mitchell, The Fictions of the Law: Have They Proved Useful or Detrimental to its Growth?, 7
HARV. L. REV. 249 (1893). Blackstone described an example as follows:
mhey are fictitious proceedings, introduced by a kind ofpiafraus, to elude
the statute de donis, which was found so intolerably mischievous, and yet
which one branch of the legislature would not then consent to repeal:
and, that these recoveries, however clandestinely introduced, are now be-
come by long use and acquiescence a most common assurance of lands
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 117 (1783) [facsimile
edition of the 1783 edition, published by Garland Publishing, Inc., N.Y. and
London, 1978.]
143. Such as the splitting of legal and equitable title in real property law.
144. Such as banks' use of standby letters of credit when suretyship is ultra vires.
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Evolution theory in law is a theory of history, but it is also more.
It provides a framework that integrates the traditional analytic
method of stare decisis (retention/transmission) with the adapta-
tion/selection theories of the various "law and.. ." movements. In
this way it provides explanations of current states of the law with all
their faults as well as their virtues. Evolutionary explanations also
account for states of the law and changes in law as contingent; 45 the
law could have developed in different ways to states of comparable
merit.
It follows that to understand fully a given state of the law, it is
not sufficient to know why it was selected and to what present social
phenomena it is adapted. We need to know as well why it is that the
development of the present law was constrained by prior states and
how that constraint worked. Without an understanding of the "ge-
netic inertia" in the lawmaking process it is not possible to under-
stand the present shape of any given body of law. It is this last point
which is the key to an evolutionary explanation of law.
The history of the common-law tort of seduction is a good ex-
ample of the evolutionary process at work. The process is high-
lighted by the contrast with the legislative redesigning of the cause
of action at critical points in history, points that coincide with the
establishment of revisions in the ideal image of women and their
role in middle to upper class society. As the myth of true woman-
hood changed, the cause of action was forced gradually to adapt.
just as in the biological world no organism can survive unchanged
in conflict with its environment, so also it seems to be with law.
In the history of seduction, the response of law to change has
been more immediate, direct, and accurate when it comes from leg-
islatures. At each major shift in the myth of femininity, legislatures,
where they did respond, did so with statutes recreating or eliminat-
ing the tort. Not so with common-law courts. It took more than a
hundred years after legislatures first began to recognize the seduced
woman as plaintiff for a common-law court finally to make that leap.
While the courts could stretch the old rules and add variations to
adapt to new conditions, they could not give up the original basic
structure no matter how maladaptive.
Lord Mansfield's famous claim that the common law "works it-
self pure" and in this is superior to statutory law' 46 is not borne out
145. John Chipman Gray emphasizes the contingency of legal development in
his discussion of the historical school. See J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF
THE LAW 93-95 (1909).
146. "[A] statute very seldom can take in all cases, therefore the common law,
that works itself pure by rules drawn from the fountain of justice, is for this reason
superior to an act parliament." Omychund v. Barker, I Atk. 21, 33, 26 Eng. Rep.
15, 23 (1744) (argument of Mr. Murray, then Solicitor-General of England, later
Lord Mansfield).
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by this historical evidence. Common-law judges have been slow in-
deed to match the demands of the "fountain ofjustice." 14 7 Legisla-
tures have shown greater adaptability, rewriting the requirements of
the tort or eliminating it entirely as the circumstances required. 148
By contrast the judiciary, while willing to stretch the historical cause
of action to its limits in an effort to meet society's needs, proved
incapable of the radical response called for by radical changes in
society.
It is exactly this inability to make revolutionary revisions that
characterizes evolutionary processes, distinguishing them from the
revolutionary process of design. Legislatures can make revolution-
ary sweeps in their designs. The common-law courts have only the
old form of action to work with and cannot design a new, perfectly
adapted one. Judges tinker with the boundaries of the inherited
law, but seldom redesign it. Thus common law adaptations will
tend to be less than perfect, and although they may work well
enough, will tend to carry with them extraneous maladaptive fea-
tures. So it is in biological evolution, and so it is with common law.
147. Id. Society, notwithstanding the voracity of the bar, has adapted more
quickly by ignoring the available cause of action.
148. This is not to suggest that legislatures are perfect adaptive mechanisms; in
reality they are far from it. Calabresi argues strenuously that courts should be
given the power to "sunset" statutes because of the inability or unwillingness of
legislatures to react to change. G. CALABRESI, supra note 50. The limited scope of
expectable adaptivity of any statute was expressed eloquently by Maynard Keynes:
We cannot expect to legislate for a generation or more. The secular
changes in man's economic condition and the liability of human forecast
to error are as likely to lead to mistake in one direction as in another. We
cannot as reasonable men do better than base our policy on the evidence
we have and adapt it to the five or ten years over which we may suppose
ourselves to have some measure of prevision; and we are not at fault if we
leave on one side the extreme chances of human existence and of revolu-
tionary changes in the order of Nature or of man's relations to her.
J. KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE 204 (1920). Whether Cal-
abresi is right to think the courts more actively adaptive is, as noted above, an em-
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